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Inseparable Evils: The Chimera of Colony and Genocide in German Southwest
Africa
Justin M. Hannigan
Between 1904 and 1908, an estimated eightypercent of the Herero and half ofthe Nama indigenous
popUlations living in the colony of German Southwest
Africa (today the independent state of Namibia) were
systematically killed by direct military violence, strategic denial of food and water, or maltreatment through
forced labor or in concentration camps. 1 The scale of
human loss is staggering. In few other modern European colonial contexts were indigenous popUlations so
completely and swiftly destroyed. The atrocities, which
deserve a label no less than genocide, have had lasting
effect on the people of Namibia and the memory of
. colonialism and genocide.
The treatment of the Herero and Nama genocides
within comparative genocide scholarship has, however,
distorted the historical event and been lacking in
useful conclusions. There has been a fIxation upon the
record of violence, at the expense of useful comparative historical analysis. The genocides of 1904-1908
must rather be situated as an inalienable component
of the process of German settler colonialism in Southwest Africa. The genocide was not an aberration of
colonialism in Southwest Africa; rather, it was an
I Horst Dreschler. Let us Die Fighting: The Stroggle afthe
Herem and Nama Against Gennan Imperialism (1884-1915),
(London: Zed Press, 1980),214.
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extension of the logic of settler colonialism and a
central component in the establishment of real German authority in the colony. The evils.of colonialismracism, the process of"othering" colonized peoples, the
denial of sovereign autonomy, and economic exploitation, among others - and the evils of genocide are not
usually equated. In German Southwest Africa, however, circumstance married these historical realities.
_ The history of genocide in Southwest Africa is incomplete without imbricating it with the history of colonialism. Genocide was an instrument employed by the
Germans to resolve weaknesses of their colonial
project.
The historical record of SWA demonstrates the
inseparability of the narratives of genocide and the
course of German imperialism. This paper argues that
the German colonial enterprise, in order to establish
full control over the indigenous peoples and their
lands in SWA, was hindered by economic troubles, a
lack of functional political, legal, and military authority, a dearth of metropolitan enthusiasm, and a severe
demographic problem in the form of a shortage of
German settlers. While real and historically demonstrable, this weakness contributed to a paranoiac
sense of vulnerability among the settler population. In
turn, these settlers pressured the government in Berlin
to swiftly and decisively respond to the indigenous
threat. The consequences were genocidal. I argue that
the genocide of the Herero and Nama effectively
resolved the issues facing German imperialism in
SWA, situating the tragedy as part of the broader logic
of settler colonialism driving events in the colony. The
unsteadiness of colonial authority on the eve of the
genocide can be seen in a variety of dimensions. A lack
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of metropolitan support and enthusiasm, economic
issues, underdeveloped infrastructure, the relatively
small number of German settlers and their scattered
distribution throughout the colony, and incomplete
military control and legal authority caused anxiety
among colonists and bedeviled German efforts to
cOl.trol SWA. Each of these dimensions of the colonial
enterprise will be examined in turn, up to the eve of
the genocide in 1903.
The tepidity of metropolitan enthusiasm for the
colony is evident from the earliest days of German
incursion. Otto von Bismarck, the first Chancellor of
the German Empire, was vocal in his opposition to
Germany's acquisition of overseas colonies in the first
decade and a half after the Imperial unification in
1871. If colonies were to be founded, Bismarck felt
that "the flag must follow trade.,,2 Adolf Luderitz, the
first German trader to buy indigenous land in the
territory in 1883, quickly appealed to Berlin for impe. rial protection of his purchases. Bismarck engaged in
an incredibly cautious diplomatic exchange with the
British authorities in the Cape Colony to determine the
geopolitical consequences of raising the German flag
and, after much hesitant deliberation, cabled the
German consul in Cape Town on 24 April 1884 to
"declare officially that [Luderitzj and his establishments are under the protection of the Reich."3 The
dispatch of Heinrich Goring and an attache of just two
officials in 1885 constituted the entirety of the German
administration in the colony until 1895; in the estimation of historian Jurgen Zimmerer, "this was nothing
Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 24.
, Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros, 40.
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more than a symbolic occupation of German Southwest Africa.'"
Even as the territory claimed by Germany grew to
its full extent by 1886, and considering the arrangement Bismarck had offered, Berlin responded to
indigenous uprisings - faced with circumstances
similar to those that would precipitate the genocide with nearly complete disinterest in becoming militarily
involved in the support of the SWA colony.' In response to German encroachment in 1888, sitting
Herero Chieftain Kamaherero warned Provincial
Administrator Goring and his administration of two
that "if they did not wish to see their heads lying at
their feet they should be out of Okahanda and well on
their way to Germany before sunset."6 Goring was
forced into a hurried retreat to the protection of the
British enclave at Walvis Bay in response to the threat
and promptly telegraphed Berlin for military assistance. The request was halfheartedly fulfilled in June
1889 with the dispatch of a meager 21 soldiers under
the command of Curt von Fran<;ois. 7 To historians who
wish to defend the claim that, as a general law of
European settler colonialism, invariably "frontier clash
were effectively resolved when metropolitan troops
defended settler interests," the early history of German
4 Jurgen Zimmerer, "The Model Colony? Racial segregation,
forced labour and total control in German South-West Africa," in
Genocide in German South-West A/rica, Jurgen Zimmerer and
Joachim Zeller, eds., E.J. Neather trans. (Monmouth, Wales:
Merlin Press, 2003), 25.
5 Ibid.
, Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue

Bool~

30.
7

Ibid., 32.
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conflict with the indigenous people of SWA should
serve as a cautionary ta1e! After this episode, Bismarck reiterated his position before the Reichstag: "I
repeat that I am opposed to colonies, that is, the kind
of colonies where officia1s must be placed and garrisons established... [though] if the locomotive of the
empire has struck out on a new track for itself, I will
not be the one to place stones in its way."g
Lukewarm metropolitan enthusiasm toward SWA
p ersisted up until the eve of the genocide in 1903,
a1though the Chancellorships of Leo von Caprivi (18901894) and Bernhard von Bulow (1900-1909) gradua1ly
featured greater support for Germany's overseas
possessions.1O Increasing competition with other
European imperia1 po;;vers led to somewhat greater
attention to Germany's African colonies, creating a
situation where "for reasons of nationa1 pride and
propaganda, any defeat in Southwest Africa was
unacceptable."" Institutionally, Chancellor von Caprivi
. founded the Kolonialabteilung (Colonia1 Section) under
the Imperia1 Foreign Office, charged with managing
Germany's overseas colonia1 expansion and enticing
Germans to settle in the colonies!2 By 1903, however,
the six districts that comprised the administration of

8

Cook, Colonial Encounters in the Age of High Imperialism,

23.
Bridgman, The Revolt a/the Hereros , 40.
By 1903, these included German Southwest Africa,
German East Africa (today Tanzania), Cameroon, Togo, and a
scattering of is lands in the Pacific, including Samoa and New
Guinea.
II Zimmerer, "The Model Colony?," in Genocide in Gennan
South-West Africa, 25.
12 Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros, 54.
9

10
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German SWA were manned by only about 700 soldiers
and police. 13 Although metropolitan enthusiasm for the
colonial endeavor in SWA did grow gradually between
1884 and 1903, commitment was not decisively
asserted until the dispatch of thousands of
Schutztruppe in response to the Herero uprising.
Retroactively considering the dearth of early metropolitan support for the colonial enterprise in 1907, Royal
Commissioner to Southwest Africa Paul Rohrbach
wrote bluntly; "The mere idea of doing something
substantial toward the opening up of a country like
South-West Africa, with such ridiculously small
working capital, is about as absurd as the idea of a
man who would try to cut a tunnel through the Alps
with a pickaxe."l4
Investment capital was also in short supply in the
colony prior to the genocide. Examining the German
Southwest Africa Company, which assumed possession of Liideritz's land purchases in 1885, Dreschler
notes "a glaring discrepancy between the fmancial
capacity of its shareholders and the modest capital
stock of the company;" that is, the small amount of
money committed to the colonizing effort was disproportionate to the extreme wealth of the German
Southwest Africa Company's shareholders. IS In spite of
Liideritz's hopeful assurances of SWA's mining potential, investors remained rightfully unconvinced. After
its fIrst year of operation, the German Southwest
Africa Company reported losses of 15 per cent on the
" Hull, Absolute Destruction, 7.
>4

Silvester and Gewald, Annotated reprint of the 1918 Blue

Book,28.
" Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 30.
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initial investment. '6 Embarrassed, the shareholders of
this enterprise publicly revised their justification for
investing in SWA, claiming it had been "out of motives
of pure patriotism in order that the country which
might in the future prove valuable would not pass into
the hands of a foreign Power."17 By 1903, several
copper mining companies had managed to establish
sustainable operations in the colony in spite of the
early difficulties. However, business reportage in the
Deutsches Kolonialblatt, a propagandistic newsletter
distributed by the Colonial Section to pUblicize German efforts in the overseas colonies and entice new
settlement, indicates indirectly that colonial mining
enterprises in SWA were still troubled by a lack of
investment. In one article, dated 15 February 1903, a
mining prospector named Christopher James gave
sunny reports of vast untouched copper lodes in the
Otavi district ofthe colony. Discussing the size onodes
he did uncover, the Kolonialblatt reported that "Herr
James writes with certainty that if bigger mine shafts
. are dug, one should find even larger ore deposits. "'B If
such anecdotal arguments for the mineral potential of
the SWA colony were still made in 1903, it is safe to
assume that investment from German industry remained unforthcoming, or was at best incommensurate with colonial administrator's ambitious expectations.
The same Kolonialblatt article touches on another
economic issue troubling the German colonial project
Bridgman, The RelJolt o/the Hereros, 53.
Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue
Book,28.
16

17

18

<lOtavi-Minen und Eisen bahngesellschaft," Deutsches

Kolonialblatt, 15 February, 1903.
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in SWA prior to the genocide: the difficulty of recruiting indigenous labor. According to the article, "Herr
James writes of the Herero as a fine people with good
spirit and strong physicality. They are willing, good
hearted, happy workers, quick on the up-take and
outstandingly quick learners in the use drills and
hammers, if they are handled properly."l9 Variations in
opinion among German settlers regarding the aptitude
of the Herero as laborers are to be expected, but it
would be in accordance with the generally positive
tone of the Kolonialblatt to emphasize the benefits of
life and the possibilities of business in SWA. Many
other settler accounts express frustration with managing indigenous labor. In 1902, a missionary named
Herr Brincker described his perception of the Herero
residing near his church: "Shocking immorality,
disputatiousness, and thievery rule, specifically, the
inner life of the [Herero] congregations. Everything is
communal, sex in the highest degree."20 In addition to
the perceived foibles of the Herero work ethic, a great
many laborers were able to simply leave employment
if they wished, by escape if not by mutual contract!l
Those German settlers who pursued farming and cattle
herding and were thus not reliant on large indigenous
workforces, however, were at the same time succeeding
economically through an insidious combination of
thrift and theft: among them, the 1,052 German
farmers in the colony by 1902 owned 44,487 head of
"Ibid.
20 Karla Poewe, The Namibian Herero: A History of Their
Psychosocial Disintegration and Survival (Lewiston, New York:
Edwin Mellen, 1985), 4l.
21 Gewald, Herero Heroes, 129.
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cattle, almost exclusively appropriated from the
Herero. 22 Though settlers capably subsisted on the
land through farming and raising cattle, grander
commercial prospects for the colony remained bleak
because of difficult labor relations and the failing
promise of lucrative mineral deposits.
The precarious state of the German colony in SWA
on the eve of the genocide was reflected in the deficiencies of transportation infrastructure on which European colonialism necessarily relied. Regular shipping
routes between the German port of Hamburg and the
colony were nonexistent in the early years of the
colony, whereas other European colonial powers
already had well-established modes of transporting
goods and personnel to African colonies. A telling
example of this is that when Captain von Fran\;ois
departed for SWA with his 21 soldiers in June 1889,
they were forced to pose as "adventurers" rather than
soldiers in order to earn passage on a British ship
. bound for Walvis Bay.23 Railways in the colony were
also underdeveloped. The rinderpest epidemic that
swept across Africa between 1889 and 1897, killing
perhaps 90,000 cattle in SWA alone, forced a shift
away from the reliance on the ox-wagon transport
. network utilized earlier in the colony.24 Indeed, construction of a railway linking Windhoek, the administrative capital of the colony and an interior settlement,
to the coast via Swakopmund had only begun in 1897
as a response to the massive loss of beasts of burden
" Silvester and Gewald, Annotated reprint of the 1918 Blue
Book,73.
23 Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 42 .
" Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue
Book, 72 and 73 (footnote).
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as a result of this epidemic. 25 Even by 1904, vast
portions of the territory still remained inaccessible by
rail. 26 And, when a small revolt by the Nama forced
Governor Theodor Leutwein southward with the
majority of the Schutztruppe at the beginning of
January 1904 - an opportunity which the Herero
seized to begin their uprising on 14 January - the
absence of a major north-south rail line delayed the
German military's return to the Windhoek area until
11 February.27
The political and legal relations between the German administration and indigenous leadership were
increasingly unsteady by 1904. In this instance, it was
the over-extension of German power that threatened
the colonial enterprise. Disorganization and lack of
foresight led to the irresponsible exercise of colonial
authority on the part of the Germans. The precise
tenets of the protection agreements forged by Leutwein
and his predecessors with the various tribes were
largely ignored in all dealings between Europeans and
Africans, and the colonial administration treated the
agreements as a surrender oj authority in practically
every legal and political situation. 28 Crucially, however,
German authority across vast tracts of the territory
prior to the war of 1904-1907 was practically nonexistent. Outside the boundaries of effective colonial
c:mtrol, tribes such as the Ovambo were largely
beyond the purported aegis of German law and order,
free to conau::t the;r own political and legal business
Gewald, Herem Heroes, 128.
A map depicting just how little rail infrastructure existed
in German SWA is available in Hull, Absolute Destruction, 9.
27 Ibid., 7-11.
25

26

28

Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 26.
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pending the possibility of German expansion. However,
in those regions of the colony where German policing
and authority did reach - namely, Hereroland -legal
ordinances enshrined the concept that "leniency
toward natives is cruelty to whites."29 Capital punishment was consistently and ruthlessly applied in cases
of serious crimes committed by Africans against
Germans, while white settlers received juridical license
to perpetrate even the most heinous crimes against
Africans. "Surely, this goes to prove," Governor
Leu twein wrote, "that a higher value was placed on the
life of a white man than on that of a native.,,30 By the
turn of the century, Leutwein had evidently come to
believe that the rapine behavior of the average German
settler toward indigenous peoples was endangering the
legitimacy of the German colonial endeavor.
As interactions between "colonizer" and "colonized"
became even more unjust, tensions between German
settlers and particularly the Herero grew. Leutwein
. became distressed that the settler population was
fulfIlling its own prophetic fear of a large-scale indigenous uprising.31 By 1904, three fault lines undercut
German efforts to establish a unified program of legal
and political dominance over SWA and its indigenous
people. First, the incredibly prejudiced exercise onegal
and political power on the part of the German settlers
against the Herero had not forced them into dejected
submission to colonial a uthority, but was rather
driving the Herero closer to militancy and open strug" Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue
Book,93.
" Ibid., 94.
31

Gewald, Herero Heroes, 142.
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gle against Germany. Second, the German settler
population, motivated by a complex of paranoia about
indigenous threats and an ideologically-absolute
mentality of settler colonialism that demanded superiority and security in every dimension of colonial life,
was agitating for even more forceful treatment ofnative
groups such as the Herero and, incidentally, greater
metropolitan support of this position. Between these
two mutually incompatible schemas stood the precious
few reasonable individuals - some within the colonial
administration; such as Governor Theodor Leutwein;
some sitting in the Reichstag, such as socialist August
Bebel;32 and some from the indigenous populations,
most notably Hendrik Witbooi of the Nama - who
were interested in a reasoned and non-violent renegotiation of the terms which had to that point guided the
course of German colonialism in Southwest Africa.
Leutwein later made a crucial observation, which
sheds much light on the commission of genocide on
the part ofthe German military. German settlers, who
did not understand the delicate balance of the fledgling
colonialism in SWA, "Were inclined, with their inborn
feeling of belonging to a superior race, to appear as
members of a conquering army, even though we had
conquered nothing."33 Indeed, the Germans, up to
1903, actually had not conquered the lands that were
being settled. In all the haphazard weaknesses and the
32 Helmut Walser Smith, "The Talk of Genocide, the Rhetoric
of Miscegenation: Notes on Debates in the Gennan Reichstag
Concerning Southwest Africa, 1904-14," in The Imperialist
Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy, Sara
Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop, eds. (Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 107.
33 Gewald, Herero Heroes, 145.
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uneven excesses of brutal power exercised by the
colonizing Germans, the fundamental recourse to arms
had not been denied to the Herero, neither through
disarmament nor through the development of a military presence large enough to deter violent rebellion.
On 14 January, Chieftain of the Herero Samuel
Maherero issued orders that all German males in
Hereroland were to be round up and killed.34 Reliable
accounts show that in the first weeks of the war,
somewhere around 150 settlers - and only a few of
them women - were killed by the Herero, but the
German press reported inflated accounts of the
coldblooded killings of women and children, the Herero
practice of mutilating the bodies of enemies killed in
battle, and wanton rape and pillage. 3s These reports
shocked metropolitan Germans. Reinforcements were
ordered immediately and arrived from Germany under
the ruthless command of Lieutenant General Lothar
von Trotha. He possessed a conviction that "all colo.nies had to be conquered with blood" and wrote in his
diary on 1 July 1904 that "the natives must give way ...
either via the bullet of the mission, with alcoho1.,,'6 By
August 1904 the German military had forced the
majority of the Herero fighting forces into a decisive
battle at the Waterberg in east-central SWA. The
Herero had gathered the majority of their tribes,
including cattle herds, women, and children, as was
customary of their practice of war. At this defining
moment when the war precipitated into genocide, the
Herero were defeated in battle and forced to retreat

34
35

36

Hull, Absolute Destruction, 10.
Ibid.
Ibid., 30.
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into the arid and unlivable Omaheke desert. Several
hundred died in battle, and large portions of their
cattle herds were slaughtered. Several thousand,
including their leader Samuel Maherero, escaped
through the desert into British-controlled
Bechuanaland. The majority of the Herero, however,
were not so lucky. Thousands perished of dehydration
and starvation. On 2 October, several weeks after the
battle, von Trotha issued an extermination order for
the Herero people. Hendrik Witbooi, the chief of the
Nama, perceived that the German military administration would come after the Nama once they had finished
their slaughter of the Herero. 37 He led his southern
tribes to stand alongside the Herero in revolt shortly
after the extermination order was issued in October
1904.'8
The dust had finally settled by 1908. All told,
60,000 of the original 80,000 Herero and 10,000 ofthe
original 20,000 Nama had been killed. 39 The Herero
and Nama societies "were now deprived of land and
cattle and were without leaders;" their traditional way
of life was irretrievably lost.40 The escalation from war
to genocide is at least partly explained by the metropolitan and military decision to treat the insurgent
tribes with an unyielding ferocity to defend the prestige
of the military, "the premier institution of the
Kaiserreich."41 The issuance of the extermination
order, however, was undoubtedly connected to the
Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 183.
Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros, 137.
" Dreschler, .I·et Us Die Fighting, 214.
40 Gewald, "Colonisation, Genocide, and Resurgence," in
Genocide in Gennan South-West Africa, 136.
37

38

41

Hull, Absolute Destruction, 37.
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demands of the settler community, which wished for a
total and final resolution of the issues that had been
facing the colonial effort. The specific conduct of the
German military in the handling of the genocide and
the outcomes of these policies did have a direct and
instrumental effect in the resolution of the multitudinous issues hindering the German colonial project.
The commission of genocide led to an increase of
metropolitan attention toward German SWA, facilitated
the improvement of the economic situation, provided
the labor and security to further develop infrastructure, alleviated demographic concerns, and extended
military control and legal authority in the colony.
Metropolitan commitment increased markedly as a
direct result of the genocide in SWA, althou gh not
necessarily as a reaffirmation of the colonizing mission. Certainly, the dispatch of large numbers of
troops under von Trotha in June 1904 itself constitutes a serious increase in metropolitan commitment.
. The total German military presence in the colony by
1907 had reached 20,000 men, a serious army with
serious support from the General Staff in Berlin.42
However, the conduct of the war in SWA and particularly the emerging accounts of the horrendous treatment of the Herero and Nama aroused serious political
opposition. The German satirical newspaper
Simplicissimus ran a special issue focused particularly
on criticism of German policy and settler behavior in
the colonies on 3 May 1904. 43 Even in the Reichstag,
an anticolonial coalition emerged in 1906 under the
leadership of August Bebel successfully blocked a vote

42
43

Bridgman, The Re volt o/the Herems , 112 .
"Spezial-Nummer Kolonien," Simplicissirnus , 3 May 1904.
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to approve further funds for the war in SWA, which by
then totaled 585 million Reichsmark. 44 In January
1907, Kaiser Wilhelm II dissolved the Reichstag and
called for an election; this "Hottentot election" of 1907
is referred to as the only election in European history
to serve entirely as a referendum on colonial issues,
and resulted in the formation of a legislature decisively
in favor of the continuation of German colonialism!S
Whether supportive or critical of the conduct of the
war and colonial policy in SWA, the severity of the
genocide had seized the attention of nearly every
political actor and voter in metropolitan Germany by
1907. Politically, the commitment to the colony had
been sealed in blood, and the new and very public
focus was on determining the future course of German
policy in SWA.
The genocide of the Herero and Nama was also
instrumental in that it led to a significant alleviation of
the economic concerns facing the colony. Reflecting
the fundamental focus on land inherent to settler
colonialism, the colonial propagandist Paul Rohrbach
noted that an incidental benefit of the war had been
the clearing of lands already purchased by German
companies, "a task that would have otherwise proven
difficult."46 The genocide had succeeded in removing
practically all the Herero people from their traditional
lands, freeing them for settlement. This was paired
with an offer made by the German government ofland
44 Dominik J. Schaller, "From Conquest to Genocide:
Colonial Rule in German Southwest Africa and German East
Africa," in Empire, Colony, Genocide, 298.
4 S Ulrich van clef Heyden, "The 'Hottentot elections' of 1907,"
in Genocide in German South-West Africa, 113 .
46 Gewald, Herem Heroes, 143.
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grants to soldiers who volunteered to fight in war, in
order to fill the newly emptied land.' 7 After the genocide, the import of cattle into the colony from Argentina began as a response to massive livestock losses
during the war, particularly at the battle of the
Waterberg, and the preceding rinderpest epidemic. A
settler woman wrote in her diary in 1909 about a
transaction between her brother-in-law and a cattle
trader named Herr Lu.: "He used to be a cowboy on a
big farm in Argentina ... He came to our colony and
survived the uprising of the Herero and its end.
Because he had good connections in Argentina, he got
a job from the government to buy up cattle for the
farmers here."'8 This evidences that the settler cattle
export economy had become economically viable after
the genocide, and indicates an improvement of the
German economic circumstances of the colony generally. Dreschler describes the years between 1908 and
1914 as a "profit bonanza" for German investment,
with the German South West Africa Company paying
its shareholders a dividend of 64 per cent in 1909.'9
Incidentally and without relation to the genocide
specifically, diamonds had also been discovered by
prospectors.
An attempt to resolve earlier difficulties in securing
indigenous labor was directly tied to the processes of
genocide. Those Herero and Nama who surrendered or
were taken as prisoner in battle, including women and
children, were brought to concentration camps
Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros, 112 .
Antonia Thiede, Kleine Missis Toni: Mddchen und
Frauenjahre im Sonnenland Deutsch-Siidwest, dem heutigen
Namibia (Winhoek, Namibia: Benguela, 2004), 112.
49 Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 244.
47

18
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throughout the colony and subjected to forced labor.
The largest and most notorious of these camps was on
Shark Island, in the harbor of the German port of
Luderitzbucht. 50 Throughout the colony, some 17,018
prisoners had been taken into concentration camps by
July 1906.51 These prisoners were functionally enslaved and served as a source of labor for infrastructure projects in the port towns and on the railways.
Between December 1905 and November 1906, around
900 Herero and Nama prisoners were employed in the
construction of a new rail line between Luderitzbucht
and the interior. 52 Elsewhere, the prisoners were forced
into labor on farms, tasked with laying the groundwork
for more permanent German settlement. 53 These
concentration camps served insidiously dual purposes:
not only did they allow German businesses to circumvent earlier troubles with indigenous labor, but the
poor conditions in the camps and the brutal overworking of the prisoners extended genocidal tactics and
results beyond the battlefield. A British official reports
that "many again died at the hands of the overseer and
by the lash. Probably 60 per cent of the natives who
surrendered [after the lifting of the extermination
order] died this way.,,5. In the concentration camps,
50 Casper Erichsen, «The angel of death has descended
violently among them": concentration camps and prisoners-oJ-war
in Nambia, 1904·08 (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 20051, 22.
51 Erichsen, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on
Shark Island," in Genocide in German South-West Africa, 85.
" Silvester and Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue
Book, 171.
53 Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 232.
S4 Silvester and Gewald. Annotated Reprint a/the 1918 Blue
Book, 171.
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the very strategies and methods of genocide were
instrumental to the growth of colonialism in German
SWA. German infrastructure was literally built on the
back of forced African labor.
The genocide also gave the opportunity for a
complete overhaul of the legal and political relationship Germans and indigenous Africans, as well as for
the restructuring and expansion of administrative
authority in the colony. While the laws had been
extremely prejudiced against Africans before, the
genocide all the more firmly convinced German settlers , judges, and metropolitan lawmakers that harsh
legal treatment of the indigenous popUlation was
necessary. Theodor Leutwein had been removed as
governor in 1905, and was replaced by Friedrich von
Lindequist, who was more agreeable to the Kaiser
because of his willingness to take whatever steps
necessary to secure German interests in the colony.55
On 18 August 1907, he issued a set of directives that
relegated the surviving Herero and Nama in German
SWA to a position of de facto subhumanity.56 Known as
Ordinance No. 82, these directives introduced three
especially unjust precedents: most indigenous groups
were barred from owning land and cattle without the
specific approval of the governor; all natives were
subject to punishment as vagrants unless they carried
identification passes demonstrating that they had
work under a European employer; and it provided that
servants could be severely punished by their masters
for even the slightest offenses without the need for a
5 5 John J. Grotpeter, Historical Dictionary of Namibia
(Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1994),606.
'" Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 231.
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trial. 57 Fears of miscegenation also led to the passage
of a law in the Reichstag specifically prohibiting
intermarriage between Germans and f,>.fricans. 58 These
new laws were certainly the harshest of those imposed
after the genocide, but even where the legal code was
not explicitly remade to disadvantage indigenous
Africans it was noted that "it is characteristic of all
these German laws that their elasticity seems unlimited, and that their application and practical exercise
seems to have depended more on local senthent [sic]
and personal and official prejudice than on the strict
tenets of legal procedure and the administration of
justice.,,59 We can be certain that the legal framework
after the genocide was focused entirely on controlling
and subduing the African population, and where
Africans did find the opportunity to protect themselves
it was always by escaping the law rather than working
within it. 60 The genocide was instrumental in directly
providing the circumstance for this revision of the
colonial legal code.
The political relationship between the indigenous
populations and the colonial administrative system
also shifted as a result of the genocide. The earlier
protection agreements were thrown out; the massacres
of the Herero and Nama had eliminated the possibility
of future uprisings, and rather than ruling through the
Grotpeter, Historical Dictionary of Namibia, 381 .
Smith, "The Talk of Genocide, the Rhetoric of
Miscegenation," in The Imperialis t Imagination: Gennan
Colonialism and Its Legacy, 117 .
• 9 Silvester a nd Gewald, Annotated Reprint of the 19 18 Blue
Book, 191.
60 Zimmerer, uThe Model Colony?," in Genocide in Gennan
South-West A/rica, 28.
57

58
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indirect powers of tribal chiefs the Germans dissolved
every independent political organization of the indigenous people and handled administration directly.61
Following the genocide, the relationship between the
German authorities and indigenous Africans ceased to
be political as such, and was handled rather through
administrative and bureaucratic channels. The quashing of African political autonomy was accompanied by
a dramatic increase in the size and effective authority
of the colonial administration. The most noteworthy
development was the German declaration of the Polizeizone throughout the southern two-thirds of the
colony.62 This was a region where the Germans felt
assured in declaring the unconditional authority ofthe
colonial administration, law, and police forces. The
region north of the so-called "Red Line" remained
under the control of indigenous chiefs, and European
trade and travel beyond the Police Zone was prohibited. 63 Appropriately, considering the name of this new
German administrative division, the police force
'throughout the colony was greatly expanded, and by
1909 a total of2,431 policemen were stationed in 69
stations throughout the colony.64 Moreover, the
administrative bureaucracy was expanded between
1903 and 1914, from 6 districts to 16. 65 The new
metropolitan commitment to the colony as well as the
real possibility of establishing effective control in the
absence of militant Herero and Nama facilitated the
" Ibid., 27.
" Grotpeter, Historical Dictionary oJ Namibia, 412 .
63 Ibid.
64 Zimmerer, "The Model Colony?," in Genocide in German
South- West Africa, 30 .
65 Ibid., 26.
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expansion of German authority and administration in
SWA, a trend permitted by the genocidal consequences
of the 1904-1908 war.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the genocide had the
effect of allaying the demographic concerns German
settlers had held before 1904. No longer were German
settlers a small minority among a large African population in central SWA. On the one hand, the total white
population tripled from 4,640 at the beginning of the
genocide to 14,840 by 1913. 66 This resulted from the
expanded economic opportunities available in the
colony after 1908, as well as the previously mentioned
provision that military volunteers from Germany could
receive grants of land. On the other hand, the very
nature of the genocide provided that only a very small
number of indigenous Herero and Nama people remained in the central and southern lands most attractive for settlement. Genocide carries demographic
consequences, and the mass murders in SWA were
instrumental in ' creating a new sense of security and
racial superiority for German settlers in the colony.
There are few people remaining in our contemporary world who consider genocide anything other than
an absolute evil to be prevented at all costs. However,
the passions behind this conviction have contributed
to an incomplete ar:d uneven treatment of particular
genocides within their historical context. The processes of colonialism and genocide in German SWA
must be imbricated. Although genocide pursued as a
utopian solution to the problems facing the German
colony did not resolve every weakness of the colonial
" Dreschler, Let Us Die Fighting, 244 .
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mission,67 the fact that the commission of genocide
fundamentally strengthened and altered the character
of German colonial authority in SWA cannot be ignored. The wholesale massacre of the Herero and
Nama in what is today known as Namibia should
certainly be remembered for its violence and human
devastation, acknowledging the suffering of groups
from the past to prevent such atrocities from being
committed against others in the future, but also
remembered not only for that: it also serves as a
reminder that the horrors of genocide are not isolable
from the historical circumstances under which they
occur. The genocide of the Herero and Nama occurred
within the structure and logic of German imperialism
and wa:s instrumental to the goals and aspirations of
the colonial project in Southwest Africa. Reexamining
the genocide beyond the traditional boundaries of
comparative genocide studies yields more specific and
valuable insights such as these, and I suggest that
. historians of all genocides and mass murders eschew
the existing comparative models in favor of more
contextualized analyses.

Justin Hannigan is a senior History student at
Santa Clara University, focusing primarily on issues in
European colonial history.

67 Jurgen Zimmerer, for example, argues too strongly that
the genocide failed to solve many issues in "The Model Colony? ,n
in Genocide in Gennan South-West Africa, giving little attention
to the marked increase in the strength and authority of the
German administration as compared to before the genocide.
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